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1. Introduction 
Financial crisis of 2007-2008 exposed severe flaws in banks’ capital requirements and 
thereby commenced widespread discussion among regulators how similar crisis could be 
avoided in the future. Since the crisis, several new regulation entities have been put up by 
different regulators globally and locally in order to avoid, or at least mitigate, forthcoming 
banking turmoil. The most notable and exhaustive regulation entity so far has come from the 
Basel committee on banking supervision, the primary global standard-setter for the prudential 
regulation of banks, which took steps in that direction by publishing Basel III  voluntary 
regulatory standard. 
As part of the revised framework, among other things, banks are required to hold more 
loss-absorbing capital, namely Tier 1 capital, which consists of  Core Equity Tier 1 capital 
(CET1) and Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1), and Tier 2 capital (T2). According to regulatory 
standard, from March 31st 2019 on, banks must hold total capital equal to at least 8% of risk-
weighted assets (RWA), Tier 1 capital must equal at least 6% of RWA and CET1 must be at 
least 4.5 % of RWA at all times. In addition, Basel III states single set of criteria that instruments 
are required to meet before inclusion in the relevant category (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2011). These new criteria for banks’ capital create a situation where older types 
of hybrid capital, such as lower Tier 2 capital and Tier 3 capital, will no longer be recognized 
as loss-absorbing instruments by the regulators and are hence already in the process to be 
replaced by 2019. This transition period creates demand for new types of instruments that help 
banks to meet the more demanding minimum capital requirements.  
Even though several contingent capital instruments exists, the focus in the new regulatory 
environment is on Contingent convertible capital instruments, or CoCos, which are hybrid 
capital securities that absorb losses in accordance with their contractual terms when the capital 
of the issuing bank falls below a certain level (BIS 2013). Consequently, by the definition, all 
version of CoCos have the common feature of increasing bank capital in adverse states of the 
world by converting hybrid capital to common equity. Hence the name, contingent convertible. 
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1.1 Background and motivation 
Current academic literature has mainly focused on the design and pricing of contingent 
convertible securities. My study approaches the topic from the latter standpoint since to the best 
of my knowledge, there is currently only one paper, by Wilkens and Bethke (2014), which 
assesses empirically three different pricing models for CoCo bonds. Moreover, given that their 
results are inconclusive due to the limited number of bonds and comparatively short historical 
time series, the study settles for outlining three main criteria that are required from suitable 
pricing model: explicit incorporation of the CoCo bond features, accurate reflection of the CoCo 
bond as a hybrid equity-credit instrument and practical calibration so that model adapt to the 
new information.     
My study builds on these findings by studying whether structural pricing model 
introduced by Pennacchi (2010) and evaluated by Wilkens and Bethke (2014) can explain 
primary market pricing of CoCo bonds. In addition, by empirically studying CoCos issued by 
European, Latin-American, and Asia-Pacific banks and financial institutions, I aim to show that 
CoCo-specific factors are important drivers of bonds’ primary market pricing.  
My results imply that certain CoCo-specific factors have the expected sign and magnitude 
to credit spreads and that these findings hold throughout different types of contingent 
convertible securities. In addition, my results show that credit rating agencies incorporate 
CoCo-specific factors into their ratings which are issued during the issue. This finding 
underlines the fact, that investors demand compensation for special contingent risks that CoCos 
entail.  
1.2 Objectives and contribution 
Besides to structural models (e.g. Pennacchi (2010); Albul et al. (2013); Glasserman and 
Nouri (2012)), also equity derivative models (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012)) and credit 
derivative models (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012)) have been introduced for alternative 
pricing methods for CoCo bonds.  
The key contribution of the current paper is to find out whether structural model 
introduced by Pennacchi (2010) can explain the primary market pricing of banks’ CoCo bonds. 
The reasoning behind this objective is twofold: first, when choosing between above mentioned 
pricing models, structural model stands out since most of the contingent convertible bonds 
issued to date have expressed their trigger thresholds in terms of a predetermined capital ratio. 
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Thus, structural models provide a natural pricing framework that considers the institution’s 
balance sheet structure (i.e. capital ratio) as the main price driver (Wilkens & Bethke, 2014). 
Second, among structural models, Pennacchi’s (2010) model stands out because it is set up as 
a pricing model and reflects the features of CoCo bonds, thereby establishing practical ground 
for testing hypotheses. 
Considering the aforementioned approach to the topic, I try to find evidence for the 
following conclusions derived by Pennacchi: 
 
 New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are inversely related to the 
distance between bonds’ current CET1 capital ratio and the level of trigger capital ratio  
 New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos are inversely related to level 
of trigger capital ratio  
 New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are higher for bonds that 
are written down permanently compared to those that have temporary write down or equity 
conversion as a loss absorption mechanism 
 New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are higher for bonds that 
are written down temporarily compared to those that have equity conversion as a loss 
absorption mechanism 
 
Consequently, my study contributes to the existing literature by empirically testing the    
applicability of Pennacchi’s pricing model which fulfills two out three requirements set up    by 
Wilkens and Bethke (2014). Pennacchi’s model can be considered as valid starting point for 
empirical testing since no other model fulfilled more than one requirement.  
1.3 Limitations of the study 
I acknowledge that study is based on limited set of data and that this could undermine the 
generalizability of my results. Additionally, my study omits one possibly notable credit spread 
factor from the regression models, namely combined buffer which is related to issuer’s capital 
core capital structure and its sufficiency. Moreover, since the breach of combined buffer may 
lead to cancellation or postponement of coupons, it has clear connection to riskiness of a bond 
and in that way affects to credit spread. Naturally, this could cause omitted variable bias where 
my regression models compensate for the missing factor by over- or underestimating the effect 
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of one of the other factors. The factor is omitted from the analysis since Bloomberg or any other 
data vendor is not able to provide reliable data at the moment.  
Both the limited data set and possibly important omitted variable bias create obvious 
incentives for the future research in the field of contingent convertibles. 
1.4 Main results 
Results of my study generate evidence for H1 which proposes that credit spreads at the 
issuance for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are inversely related to the distance between 
bonds’ current CET1 capital ratio and the level of trigger capital ratio. This finding is both 
economically and statistically significant both Europe and Asia-Pacific & Latin-America 
regions. Furthermore, my study fails to create statistically significant evidence for other 
hypotheses.  
However, the by-product and other main finding of my study is that credit ratings are the 
single most significant driver both economically and statistically for credit spreads of 
contingent convertible securities when they are issued. By analyzing determinants of credit 
ratings, I find credit rating agencies incorporate CoCo-specific factors into them. This explains 
the multicollinearity between these variables. To elaborate, volatility adjusted distance to 
trigger and permanent write-down dummy seem to be the biggest drivers of credit ratings. 
Consequently, both offer interesting topics for further research. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will briefly go through the key features 
and definitions of CoCos. In Section 3, I review the literature related to determinants of credit 
spreads for both typical corporate bonds and contingent convertible bonds. Section 4 presents 
the hypotheses of my study. Data is introduced in section 5, methodology in section 6 and 
results and robustness check in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Key features of contingent convertibles 
The brief history of these securities means that CoCo-market is still in a flux and lacks 
widespread standardization. However, CoCos that are issued so far share three key features 
which distinguish them from standard senior or subordinated debt securities issued by banks 
and other financial institutions: host instrument and its key features, the loss absorption 
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mechanism and the trigger that activates loss-absorption mechanism. In addition, certain CoCos 
have compulsory capital requirements, namely combined buffer requirements, which limit 
issuers’ coupon payments and other discretionary distributions. These features are presented 
thoroughly next. 
2.1 Host instrument 
CoCos can currently have two different host instruments, Additional Tier 1 (AT1) and 
Tier 2 (T2), namely. Both AT1s and T2s satisfy regulatory capital requirements under Basel 
III1 and thus share same elements. For example, current Basel III framework requires all AT1 
and T2 securities to have point of non-viability (PONV) trigger which effectively gives local 
banking supervisor a discretionary chance to activate loss-absorption mechanism if they doubt 
issuing bank’s ability to stay solvent. However, T2 CoCos, unlike AT1s, typically have pre-
determined mature dates and mandatory coupon payments. Next, I will briefly cover both type 
of host instruments.  
2.1.1 Additional Tier 1 (AT1) contingent convertibles 
In Europe, market has converged on AT1 as the predominant host, with a limited role for 
T2 CoCos2. These securities are perpetual by definition and consequently lack any coupon step-
ups or incentives to redeem them at a given call-date. Moreover, coupons payments for AT1s 
are fully optional and can be cancelled or reduced if distribution would decrease issuer’s 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital below combined buffer requirement. Additionally, AT1 
CoCos have mandatory contractual principal write down as loss absorption mechanism instead 
of equity conversion. This mechanism has strengthened their popularity among institutional 
fixed-income investors whose mandates often prevent them from holding equity or securities 
that can be converted into equity. Finally, to qualify as AT1 capital, a CoCo needs to have 
trigger level of 5.125 % (CET1 divided by RWA) or higher.   
                                                 
1 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) for more information. 
2 Current European Market size for AT1s is €50bn whereas T2s amount to €27bn. Moreover, the expected 
market size for AT1s is expected to be €200bn and only €40bn for T2s. (Nordea internal report - Understanding 
European Bank Additional Tier 1 and Contingent Convertibles) 
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2.1.2 Tier 2 (T2) contingent convertibles 
T2 instruments have a few notable differences compared to AT1s. First, T2s typically 
have contractual maturity date unlike AT1s which, by the definition, are issuer’s going-concern 
capital. Second, T2s normally have mandatory coupons and cancellation of distribution would 
be considered as a default. Such cancellation would not be considered as a default in the case 
of AT1s (De Spiegeleer et al. (2015)). Third, in general, T2 CoCos have lower trigger levels 
than AT1 CoCos. This makes them less likely to be written down or converted into equity when 
issuer’s minimum CET1 ratio is breached.  Finally, T2 CoCos are senior to AT1 CoCos in 
issuers’ capital structure. 
2.2 Trigger 
Triggers can be linked to a capital ratio or supervisors’ discretion. In the former case, 
capital ratio is calculated by dividing issuer’s CET1 capital with Risk Weighted Assets (RWA).  
Under Basel III, the minimum trigger level for AT1 CoCos is 5.125%. As a result, there has 
been a trend towards issuing CoCos with trigger level set exactly to that minimum required 
level (BIS Quarterly Review, 2013).  
Considering the latter case, regulators can activate the loss absorption mechanism if they 
believe that such action is necessary to prevent issuing bank’s insolvency. Current Basel III 
framework requires all AT1 and T2 eligible securities to have contain discretionary trigger 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Thus, almost all issuers have included 
regulatory triggers in their bonds (De Spiegeleer et al. (2015)). 
It should be noted here that CoCos could, at least in theory, have market-value triggers 
which could be easily monitored by investors and regulators. In such a case, loss absorption 
mechanism would be activated as soon as an observable variable such as for example a share 
price of credit default swap breaches the contractual trigger level. However, CoCos with 
market-value triggers has not been issued so far. 
2.3 Loss absorption mechanism 
CoCos can restore issuer’s depleted CET1 ratio either by writing down bond’s nominal 
or converting it into equity. As mentioned above, loss absorption mechanism is initiated either 
when issuer’s trigger level is breached or when local banking supervisor decides to use its 
discretionary power to bolster bank’s capital.  
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First, due to the trigger breach, CoCos can be written down either fully or partially. 
Moreover, bond nominal can be written down permanently or temporarily. Here the face value 
of the bond can be restored if the issuing financial institution manages to restore positive 
financial results and adequate capital ratios. Furthermore, different write down conventions are 
expected to persist since the design of contingent convertibles is currently driven by local 
supervisors.  
Second, nominal of contingent convertible bond can be converted into equity with rate 
that can based on the market price of stock at the time the trigger is breached, a pre-specified 
price, or a combination of these two alternatives. The first option is likely to cause massive 
dilution of holdings of original shareholders since issuer’s stock price is expected to be very 
low at that time. On the other hand, the second option would lead to a more favorable conversion 
terms for original shareholders given that the pre-determined conversion price is above the 
prevailing share price at the trigger event. In the first option, original shareholders would have 
strong incentive to avoid trigger whereas second option would in turn decrease their motive 
dodge possible trigger event. Finally, setting the conversion price equal to the prevailing share 
price at the time of trigger breach, subject to pre-specified price floor, preserves the incentives 
for existing shareholders to avoid trigger event, while preventing unlimited dilution. 
2.4 Combined buffer 
The combined buffer is the additional equity-like capital required above the regulatory 
minimum of 4.5%, below which a bank is insolvent. The combined buffer includes the capital 
conservation buffer, countercyclical buffer and systemic buffers which are estimated to amount 
2.5%, 0.5% and 3% respectively3. Thus, the regulatory minimum plus combined buffers is 
expected to be around 10.5% for large banks by 2018. Combined Buffer is extremely important 
concept for AT1 CoCos since it establishes a situation when maximum distributable amount 
(MDA) restrictions apply. MDA in turn equals the maximum amount that bank is allowed to 
distribute in discretionary distributions (dividends, AT1 coupons and staff bonuses) when it is 
operating below the Combined Buffer requirement. Breach of the Combined Buffer leads to 
situation where coupons for AT1 CoCos must be cancelled or reduced due to the MDA 
restrictions. Consequently, Combined Buffer plays an important role in CoCo valuation 
alongside with the above mentioned factors. However, the shortage of reliable public time series 
                                                 
3 Article 141 of CRD IV (Capital requirements regulation and directive)   
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data about banks’ Combined Buffers limits its use as a pricing variable in scientific studies. For 
the same reason Combined Buffer is excluded from my study.   
3. Related literature 
This section provides an overview to the existing literature of pricing of corporate bonds 
and contingent convertible bonds issued by financial institutions. First, I will go through the 
theoretical literature about pricing of risky corporate debt without any special features. The 
section is divided into two different topics: structural models and reduced form models.  After 
laying the theoretical groundwork and context for pricing of risky debt, I will move on to the 
body of literature which discusses about the different pricing models of contingent convertibles, 
i.e. CoCos. Considering the novelty of the CoCo securities, the discussion in this field has so 
far concentrated on theoretical papers as empirical papers have been scarce due to the lack of 
data. Therefore, the main focus is on the theoretical papers.  
3.1 Pricing of corporate bonds 
There exists a large theoretical body of literature on the pricing of corporate bonds. This 
literature is usually divided between “structural models” and “reduced form” models. I will first 
present the earlier related literature of structural models and then go through the main academic 
literature concentrated on reduced form models. 
3.1.1 Structural models 
 In so-called structural models, a firm is assumed to default when the value of its liabilities 
exceeds the value of its assets, in which case bondholders assume control of the company in 
exchange for its residual value. These models build on the original insights of Black and Scholes 
(1973), who demonstrate that equity and debt can be valued using contingent claims analysis. 
Besides Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Ingersoll (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) are some of the classic papers from this area. 
All of these papers propose a firm value process, and assume that company defaults its debt 
when its value falls below some threshold. This default threshold is defined as a function of the 
amount of debt outstanding. This is to say, holding a risky debt instrument can decomposed to 
a risk-free debt claim and short position of put option which is sold to the equity holders. This 
put option gives equity holders right to put the firm at the value of the risk-free claim. Besides 
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firm value process, structural models generate predictions for what the theoretical determinants 
of credit spreads should be. The six common determinants are presented below and written with 
italic font. 
First, as pointed out by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), higher spot rate increases the risk 
neutral of the firm value process. Leland and Toft (1996) arrive at similar conclusion and note 
that credit spreads decrease as risk-free rate increases. A higher drift, i.e. risk-free rate, reduces 
the probability of default and thus reduces the credit spread in the structural model. In other 
words, higher short rate usually implies higher growth of the overall economy which in turn 
strengthens business performance across the different industries. 
Second, the spot rate process itself depends on other factors. Two most important factors 
driving the term structure of short interest rates are level and slope of the term structure. Here, 
the steepness of the Treasury curve slope (i.e. risk-free rate) reflects the expected evolution of 
spot rates. Theory predicts that an increase in Treasury yield curve slope will create a decrease 
in credit spreads. And vice versa, flattening yield curve slope usually implies decelerating 
overall economy and wider credit spreads. 
Third, structural models posit that default is triggered when firm’s leverage ratio equals 
one. Consequently, it follows that leverage drives the demanded credit spread and that increased 
leverage implies higher demanded credit spread. Among others, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein 
have (2001) concluded that firm’s outstanding debt has a significant impact on credit spread of 
that firm. 
Fourth, as mentioned above, contingent-claims approach implies that long position of 
risky corporate debt can be decomposed into long position of risk-free debt and short position 
in put option. Since the option value is increasing function of volatility, it follows that credit 
spreads should widen with asset volatility as it increases the probability of default. Zhang et al. 
(2009) provide empirical evidence on this assertion as their results show that equity volatility 
and jump effects explain an additional 14% to 18% of the total variation in levels of credit 
spreads after controlling for rating information and other structural factors. In particular, when 
all these control variables are included, equity volatility and jumps are still the most significant 
factors, even more so than the rating dummy variables (Zhang;Zhou;& Zhu, 2009). 
Fifth, the probability or the magnitude of negative downward jump in firm value increase 
credit spreads. The rational for the relationship is identical to volatility’s and credit spreads’ 
relationship described above. Cremers et al. (2008) use a structural jump-diffusion firm value 
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model to assess the level of credit spreads generated by option-implied jump risk premia and 
find that incorporating option-implied jump risk premia brings predicted credit spread levels 
much closer to observed levels. The introduction of jumps also helps to improve the fit of the 
volatility of credit spreads and equity returns. Additionally, Zhang et al. (2009) attempt to 
explain the credit default swap (CDS) premium, using a novel approach to identify the volatility 
and jump risks of individual firms from high-frequency equity prices fit of the volatility of 
credit spreads and equity returns. Their empirical results suggest that the jump risk predicts 
19% variation in CDS spread levels, whereas the volatility risk forecasts 48%. 
Sixth, business climate also plays a role in structural models. This is based on the notion 
that even if the probability of default remains constant for a firm, changes in credit spreads can 
occur due to changes in expected recovery rate which in turn should be a function of business 
climate (Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein, 2001). Moreover, Altman and Kishore (1996) find that 
recovery rates are time-varying due to different business cycles or climates. They also note that 
the original rating of a bond issue as investment grade or below investment grade has virtually 
no effect on recoveries once seniority is accounted for. Additionally, neither the size of the issue 
nor the time to default from its original date of issuance has any association with the recovery 
rate 
3.1.2 Reduced form models 
A difficulty with structural models is that investment-grade corporate bonds very rarely 
default. For example, Elton et al. (2001) conclude that only a small part of the spread between 
corporate and treasuries and the difference in spreads on bonds with different ratings is 
explained by the expected default loss. They point out that 46.17 percent of difference between 
10 year corporate and treasury yields is unexplained by taxes or expected default and show that 
the vast majority of that difference is compensation for systematic risk and is affected by the 
same influences that affect systematic risks in the stock market. 
Reduced form models, by contrast, assume exogenous stochastic processes for the default 
and the recovery rate. These models are usually fit econometrically to data on swap spreads and 
corporate bond yields (Campbell & Taksler, 2003). There are several papers which employ a 
less structured econometric analysis and ask what observable variables are correlated with bond 
yields cross-sectionally and over time. 
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Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) investigate changes in credit spreads on individual bonds 
and find that most of the variation in credit spreads is explained by the an aggregate factor 
common to all corporate bonds, whereas the factors suggested by traditional models of default 
risk explain only about one-quarter of the variation in the credit spreads as measured by adjusted 
R-squared. In their study, they try to explain credit spread changes by traditional structural 
model factors that were described on the previous sub-section. 
Furthermore, as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003) employ 
relatively unstructured econometric approach to explore the effect of equity volatility on the 
corporate bond spreads. After controlling typical credit spread determinants, they conclude that 
equity volatility can explain as much cross-sectional variation in yields as can credit ratings, 
and that volatility contributes explanatory power even in the presence of credit ratings. 
Furthermore, authors note that the effect appears to be much stronger than can be explained by 
the standard structural model of Merton (1974). 
Finally, Chen et al. (2007) examine the association between corporate bond liquidity and 
credit spreads. After using similar methods and credit spread determinants as Collin-Dufresne 
et al. (2001) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) they document that liquidity is priced in credit 
spreads. Furthermore, liquidity is a key determinant in credit spreads, explaining as much as 
half of the cross-sectional variation in credit spread levels and as much as twice the cross-
sectional variation in credit spread changes than is explained by credit rating effects alone. 
Results hold for both investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds.    
3.2 Pricing of contingent convertible bonds 
The pricing models for CoCo securities that are proposed in the literature can be broadly 
grouped in three different categories: structural models, credit derivative models and equity 
derivative models. Since my work is based on structural model, this section reviews the most 
prominent papers that consider the issuing institution’s balance sheet structure as the main price 
driver CoCo bond. 
Because most of the contingent convertible bonds issued to date have expressed their 
trigger thresholds in terms of a predetermined capital ratio, structural models provide a natural 
pricing framework for this new type of convertible security. First, Pennacchi (2010) assumes 
the bank's total asset value to follow a Wiener process while the value of deposit, subordinated 
bond and equity capital tranches are modeled depending on the asset value. In addition, he 
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integrates jump-diffusion processes, which reflect the possibility of sudden large losses in asset 
value. In the model, triggering of the CoCo depends on the asset value or some book value to 
asset value ratio. Determining the corresponding factors in practice may be extremely difﬁcult. 
This issue is not addressed in detail in the paper.  
Building partly on Pennacchi’s work, Buergi (2013) presents straight-forward structural 
approach to value CoCo bonds. Similar to earlier structural models, author assumes that issuer's 
total asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion and that there exists a certain 
relationship between the actual value of assets and its disclosed counterpart. In addition, it is 
assumed that the actual asset value equals the sum of the firm's market capitalization and its 
actual value of liabilities (following Pennacchi), the equity and the TIER-1 ratio are in a linear 
relationship and that the worse the financial condition of the firm is, the more the actual and the 
disclosed value of assets converge.  
By applying these assumptions, Buergi (2013) concludes that his model allows to clearly 
picture the basic mechanics of CoCo pricing and simultaneously introduces three major 
problems which are inherent for TIER-1 ratio triggered CoCos. First, the determination of the 
TIER-1 ratio depends on certain guidelines given by the national regulators. They usually leave 
some leeway for discretionary decisions. Correspondingly, modeling their relationship to 
straight-forward book ratios such as the equity ratio may be very difficult and require detailed 
information on the issuer's asset structure. Second, defining probability of TIER-1 ratio breach 
is difficult due the fact that actual asset values cannot be observed directly and thus one has to 
rely on implied asset values derived either from equity or credit markets. Finally, for those 
CoCos that convert to equity after trigger event, the stock price at the conversion plays naturally 
important role from the valuation perspective. Even though issuers TIER-1 ratio should be 
reflected in the market value, determining the prevalent share price at the conversion is 
troublesome. 
Alongside structural models, current academic literature leans on equity and credit 
derivative models for contingent convertible valuation. De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012) 
present examples for both of aforementioned approaches.  
Equity derivatives approach basically is a payoff replication where CoCo bond is 
divided in three separate parts: a zero coupon bond, the coupon payments and the block of 
shares received if converted. Each part is valued separately. Whereas the valuation of the 
corporate bond part is rather simple, coupon payments are modeled as multiple binary-down-
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in options and the block of shares as a knock-in forward. The binary down-and-in options 
reflect the cancellation of the coupon payments after the conversion has taken place. The 
knock-in forward represents the trigger event, when the CoCo bondholder exchanges the bond 
for shares at a predetermined strike price. Provided that triggering relies on a stock price 
trigger, the valuation of all parts is unproblematic. But in practice triggering usually depends 
on an equity or TIER-1 ratio as mentioned earlier on description of structural models. De 
Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012) bypass this issue by replacing the equity ratio trigger level 
by a representative stock price level. This generally implies positive relationship between 
company’s share price and TIER-1 equity ratio. In their empirical analysis, Wilkes and 
Bethke (2014) conclude that given the straightforward parameterization, the equity 
derivatives model is most promising approach for practical implementation for hedging CoCo 
risk.  
Furthermore, Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012) have also presented a credit derivatives 
approach for CoCo pricing. Since the main distinctive feature of CoCo is the conversion or 
write-off in the case of financial distress and consequent trigger event, the bond price should 
closely reflect the financial health and default probability of the issuer. Thus, they calculate 
the triggering probability and the expected loss in case of conversion. This results in a certain 
credit spread, which is necessary to cover the corresponding investment risks. A central 
problem with their approach is the stream of future coupon payments that the holder of the 
CoCo bond forfeits at conversion. 
Above mentioned challenges are also mentioned by Wilkens and Bethke (2014) in their 
empirical analysis of current CoCo pricing methods. Authors note that structural model reflects 
the features and dynamics of CoCo bonds in terms of its specification but that model’s 
performance strongly depends on an accurate estimation of the asset value, whose proxying via 
the market share price can lead to deviations from the actual capital ratios. In addition, other 
models suffer also from different biases. Consequently, their study states that unambiguous 
“ranking” of the approaches is not possible at this stage leading them to just outline three main 
criteria for CoCo pricing models:  
1. Explicit incorporation of the CoCo bond features, such as the capital ratio trigger, into 
a pricing model 
2. Accurate reflection of the CoCo bond as a hybrid equity–credit instrument 
3. Possibility to calibrate the model to observable market parameters 
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Finally, Wilkens and Bethke (2014) conclude none of the tested pricing models fulfill all 
these criteria. However, Pennacchi’s model is the only one that fulfills two out three criteria 
and can be hence considered less biased model also for primary market pricing of CoCo bonds. 
4. Hypotheses 
This section presents the hypotheses of this study which are based on the previous 
literature and research questions of this study. Related theoretical framework and reasoning are 
presented after each hypothesis. Furthermore, whereas the first two hypotheses are related to 
the probability of conversion and its effect on the required credit spread, the third and fourth 
hypotheses study the interdependence of conversion fraction, i.e. the amount converted to 
equity, to credit spread respectively. In other words, H1 and H2 are focused on the CoCo 
characteristics that define the probability of trigger event whereas H3 and H4 are designed to 
test how post-trigger event characteristics affect the primary market pricing of contingent 
convertible bonds. 
 
H1: New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are inversely related 
to the distance between bonds’ current CET1 capital ratio and the level of trigger capital ratio  
 
With a bigger “equity cushion” between issuer’s current CET1 level and conversion 
threshold (i.e. level of trigger capital ratio), there is a smaller change that sudden drop in banks 
assets would create conversion of contingent capital to equity or lead to write down of bond 
nominal. Thus, “equity cushion” protects CoCo-investors from possible losses. This hypothesis 
is based on the structural credit risk model of a bank that issues deposits, share-holders equity, 
and fixed or floating coupon bonds in the form of contingent capital or subordinated debt. The 
return on the bank’s assets follows a jump-diffusion process, and default-free interest rates are 
stochastic (Pennacchi, 2010).  
 
H2: New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos are inversely related 
to level of trigger capital ratio  
 
The second hypothesis proposes that the level of contingent convertibles’ trigger capital 
ratio is inversely related to the demanded yield spread at the issuance. H2 is based on 
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Pennacchi’s conclusion that delaying conversion to a point when the value of original 
shareholders’ equity is low raises the new issue yields on contingent capital since smaller equity 
cushion makes it more likely that a downward jump in asset value can occur and prevent full 
conversion to equity.  
 
H3: New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are higher for bonds 
that are written down permanently compared to those that have temporary write down or equity 
conversion as a loss absorption mechanism 
 
The third hypothesis to be tested assumes that, ceteris paribus, investors of contingent 
capital bond demand compensation for possible permanent write-downs of nominal capital. 
Naturally, given that temporary write-down is always preferable over permanent write down 
(ceteris paribus) and that equity has always non-negative value, bond investors will demand 
higher expected yield for those contingent convertibles with permanent write down as loss 
absorption mechanism. This hypothesis is based on Pennacchi’s (2010) conclusion that 
contingent capital investors will require higher new issue credit spreads, even in the absence of 
jump risk in structural model, if the conversion terms specify a discount to par value of bond 
since losses occur at conversion  
 
H4: New issue credit spreads for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are higher for bonds 
that are written down temporarily compared to those that have equity conversion as a loss 
absorption mechanism 
 
 Related to third hypothesis, CoCo investors bond demand compensation for possible 
temporary write-downs of nominal capital. Naturally, given that equity has always non-negative 
value, bond investors will demand higher expected yield for those contingent convertibles with 
temporary write down than for those that convert to equity at the trigger event. As mentioned 
before, both H3 and H4 are based on Pennacchi’s conclusion that contingent capital investors 
will require higher new-issue credit spreads, even in the absence of jump risk, if the conversion 
terms specify a discount to par value since losses occur at conversion (Pennacchi, 2010). 
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5. Description of Data 
The bond data used in this study consists of CoCo bonds issued by different financial 
institutions during the time period of 2009 – March 2015. The cross sectional bond data is 
obtained from Bloomberg Professional and it contains bulk of the required information about 
the bonds. Studies like Buergi (2013), De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012) and Wilkens and 
Bethke (2014) have used similar data source to get both quantitative and qualitative data on 
CoCos. Moreover, Bloomberg is to my knowledge the most comprehensive source for 
necessary data since all the CoCo issuances are documented there. In addition to Bloomberg, 
I’m utilizing issuers’ financial statements and Moody’s private data on CoCos to verify issuers’ 
CET1-ratios at the issuance. This is done because Bloomberg’s CET1-capital data is to some 
extent inaccurate due to various calculation methods. Thus, the first source for this data is 
issuer’s latest financial statement before the issuance. If the appropriate data is not disclosed 
there, then Moody’s CoCo-report is utilized. Bloomberg’s database is the last source for this 
data.  
Bloomberg search function returns 221 different ISINs when “Is Capital Contingent” - 
criteria is applied for bond search. After excluding duplicates (i.e. equivalent bonds with 
different ISINs due to different documentation), bonds without English documentation and/or 
reliable accounting data from the issuance data, the sample size amounts to 112. Table 1 
summarizes this data. 
As the table shows, the growth of contingent convertible market has accelerated steadily 
from 2009 to 2015. Consequently, the bulk of the data used in this study comes from time period 
Year Number of issuers Number of bonds issued Total transaction volume ($bn)
2009 1 1 0.2
2010 2 2 2.0
2011 2 2 4.3
2012 10 12 14.0
2013 16 23 25.0
2014 35 58 106.1
1-3/2015 10 14 12.6
Total 112 164.3
Table 1 Global primary market CoCo transactions from 2009 to 2015 
This table illustrates the global issuance volume of contingent convertible bonds in terms of number of issuers, number 
of different bonds and total transaction volume. Year 2015 includes only those CoCos that are issued before end of March. 
First column presents the number distinct issuers in a given year. Second column shows the number of bonds that these issuers 
have issued during that year. Finally, the third column presents the total transaction volume of these issues in USD billions.   
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2012-2014. This period contains 93 bonds (out of the total 112) and 61 issuers. The total 
transaction volume from the same period amounts to $145.1 billion which is more than 88 % 
of the total transaction volume during the whole sample period. First three years contain only 5 
different transactions and total transaction volume amounts to $6.5 billion. Furthermore, my 
data set includes also 14 bonds also from present year. Thus, the sample period spans from 2009 
to March 2015.  
Figure 1 presents the geographical distribution of CoCo issuers in dataset. As can be seen 
from the figure, to date, most of the issuers come from continental Europe, namely 43.8%. 
Furthermore, within continental Europe, more than half of CoCos are issued by Swiss 
institutions such as UBS and Credit Suisse which are defined as global systematically important 
banks, i.e. G-SIBS. Continental Europe and UK CoCos represent 26.8 % of my sample. 
Scandinavian issues amount to 16.1 % of the data whereas bonds issued outside of the three 
aforementioned regions comprise 13.4 % of the sample.  
Figure 2 illustrates how the popularity of different loss-absorption mechanisms has evolved 
during the sample period. As the figure shows, CoCos with write-down as loss absorption 
mechanism dominate the bond sample. From the included 112 CoCos, 74 are written down 
either temporarily or permanently if bond’s trigger level is breached. Moreover, as can be seen 
from the figure, popularity of write down has grown over time. 
Figure 1 Geographical distribution of CoCo issuances 
This figure represents the geographical distribution of CoCo issuers in my dataset. Issuer’s home country equals 
country of domicile defined by Bloomberg. As can be seen from the figure, more than two fifths of the CoCos included in to 
the sample are issued by continental European banks and financial institutions. Issuers from United Kingdom represent the 
second largest issuer group whereas Scandinavian issuers represent are third biggest group. Rest of the world equals mainly 
Russian and Chinese issuers.   
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Alongside CoCo-specific data, Bloomberg also provides all the relevant data for different 
control variables such as issue size, bond maturity, rating, volatility of issuer’s equity, risk-free 
rate, steepness of the risk-free yield curve and TED-spread4. Moreover, I also retrieve treasury 
rates data for different currencies from Bloomberg to calculate the credit spread at the issuance. 
Finally, Table 2 contains summary statistics classified by aggregated credit ratings. Here, 
aggregated credit rating equals the average credit rating that bond has received from Moody’s, 
S&P and/or Fitch. If only one rating agency has rated the bond then the aggregate rating equals 
that rating. Several observations are apparent. First, Table 2 shows that credit spreads and credit 
ratings seem to have, unsurprisingly, negative correlation. Moreover, on average, first call date 
for rated CoCos is set 5 to 8 years from the issue (maturity).  Interestingly, all the eight BBB-
rated bonds have permanent write down feature for loss-absorption mechanism. This might 
reflect one of rating agencies’ prerequisites for BBB or BBB+ ratings. The rationale behind this 
prerequisite is that CoCos that are written down permanently after trigger level breach are much 
                                                 
4 In this case, the TED spread is the difference between the 3 month Euribor-rate and on short-term German 
Treasury bills, Bubills. 
  
Figure 2 Distribution of loss-absorption mechanism of CoCos 
This figure presents the popularity of different loss-absorption mechanisms among CoCo sample during the 
period of 2009-March 2015. The dark part of the column represents equity conversion CoCos whereas the grey part 
depicts CoCos that are written down either completely or partially if trigger level is breached.  As can be seen from the 
columns, write down feature has gained popularity over the time. 
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more straightforward to valuate compared to those that are written down only temporarily or 
converted to equity.      
6. Methodology 
In this section, I will present OLS regression model which is used to confirm/refute my 
research hypotheses. The model is adopted from the Chen et al. (2007) paper with few 
modifications. Modifications are mainly due the fact, that the original paper studies 
determinants of yield spreads of ordinary corporate bonds whereas I’m concentrating on 
contingent convertible bonds issued by banks and other financial institutions. Moreover, Chen 
et al. (2007) apply US secondary market data in their study while my data consists of European 
primary market contingent convertible transactions. 
6.1 OLS regression model for credit spread analysis 
Earlier literature shows that spread in rates between corporate and government bonds 
cannot be solely explained by expected default loss or tax premiums, which are typical for the 
former bond class. For example, Elton et al. (2001) point out that even after accounting for the 
impact of default and taxes, a large part of differential between corporate and treasury bonds 
remains unexplained. Authors show that the vast majority of this difference is compensation 
CCC+ B B+ BB- BB BB+ BBB- BBB BBB+
N of bonds 1 - 5 18 23 16 16 8 -
Credit spread at the issue (bp) 834.9 - 683.2 582.3 546.7 566.9 455.1 424.6 -
Maturity (year) 7.0 - 6.1 7.4 7.1 6.5 6.0 7.6 -
Amount itssued (million USD) 333 - 635 1733 1499 1206 1056 1967 -
Trigger level (bp) 200.0 - 343.0 615.0 512.5 556.3 594.5 525.0 -
Equity conversion 0 - 0 11 5 6 6 0 -
Temporary write-down 1 - 1 7 12 5 7 0 -
Permanen write-down 0 - 4 0 6 5 3 8
Aggregate credit rating
Table 2 Description of rated CoCo sample 
This table presents summary statistics for rated contingent convertible bonds which are included in the sample data. 
Aggregated rating equals the average credit rating that bond has received from Moody's, S&P and/or Fitch.  If only one rating 
agency has rated the bond then the aggregate rating equals that rating. All values excluding different trigger breach actions 
presented in table are average values per each rating category. First row reports the number of bonds per each rating category. 
Credit spread and trigger level are reported in basis points. Maturity depicts the difference between bonds' issue date and first 
call date. 
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for systemic risk which is affected by the same dynamics that affect systematic risks in the stock 
market. Number of studies continued their work by showing that rate spreads can be also 
explained by bond liquidity (e.g. Chen et al. (2007)) and idiosyncratic equity risk (e.g. Campbell 
and Taksler (2003)).  
I will use a modified version of regression model of Chen et al. (2007) to test my 
hypotheses. The modifications that I will make to the model are as following: First, I add the 
relevant CoCo factors to the model. Second, I remove the firm specific factors (Pretax coverage 
dummy, Operating income per sales, Debt to sales, and Debt to capitalization) from the model 
since these are reflected in the credit ratings that are issued after a given bond transaction is 
announced . Third, I will measure liquidity by the size of the issue instead of bid-ask spread, 
proportion of zero returns or the LOT estimate. This modification is needed because I’m using 
only primary market data. Consequently, the “amount outstanding” factor is excluded from the 
model and it’s replaced with liquidity. Fourth, I will exclude coupon variable from the 
regression since its purpose in the original study of Elton et al. (2001) was to show that lighter 
taxation of government bonds compared to corporate bonds in US results in positive yield 
spread for corporate bonds. Given that my dataset contains bonds from different tax 
jurisdictions, utilization of coupon percentage as a control variable would be dubious. Finally, 
I am using the following regression model to study different contingent convertible features’ 
effect to yield spread on primary market transactions: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
=  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽1010𝑌𝑟 − 2𝑌𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
− 3 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Here, the first explanatory variable refers to difference between bank’s CET1 capital ratio 
at the issuance date and the trigger level which initiates the loss absorption mechanism if 
breached. Naturally, this coefficient is supposed to tell if distance to trigger and new issue credit 
spreads are inversely correlated, in other words, whether H1 holds.  Second factor is in included 
to the model to see if the trigger capital ratio levels and credit spreads are negatively correlated. 
23 
  
The sign of the coefficient tells us if H2 can be accepted. Third factor is dummy variable which 
tells whether investors of contingent capital bonds demand compensation for possible 
permanent write-down of nominal capital instead of temporary write-down or equity 
conversion. Thus, this coefficient sheds light on H3. Furthermore, model’s fourth factor is also 
a dummy variable which illustrates whether investors demand higher yield spreads for CoCos 
which nominal is written off temporarily rather than converted to equity. In general, the first 
two factors are related to probability of the loss absorption mechanism being activated and its 
effect on primary market pricing of contingent convertible bonds. Additionally, third and fourth 
factor are included into the model to see how post-breach features of CoCos affect their primary 
market pricing.  
The control variables can be divided into bond-specific, firm-specific and market specific 
variables. First, regarding to bond-specific control variables, rating variable controls the effect 
of issuers’ credit risk profile to the yield spread. I will use the average of Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s rating whenever possible5. If only one rating agency has rated the issue, I 
consider that agency’s rating. In contrast to studies like Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Chen 
et al. (2007), I don’t couple rating variable with accounting variables since one can assume that 
ratings incorporate and reflect all the relevant accounting ratios when they are issued 
simultaneously with a given bond. Second, to proxy differences in corporate bond liquidity, I 
include issue size (in USD) in the regression. If bond’s issue currency is other than USD, issue 
date’s end-of-day mid quote is used to convert issue size in US dollars. Third, maturity variable 
is included in the model to control interest rate risk’s effect on bonds’ yield spread. Here, 
maturity is defined as a year fraction between issue date and the next call date.  
Campbell and Taksler (2003) provide evidence that equity volatility is directly related to 
the cost of borrowing for corporate issuers. Thus, In addition to bond-specific features, I will 
include equity volatility as a firm-specific control variable to my regression model. For each 
bond, I consider the equity data for the 180 days prior to issue date.  
Finally, in addition to afore mentioned bond- and firm-specific information I’m including 
three market wide control variables to the model. These are the 1 year swap rate, the difference 
between the 10-year and 2-year swap rates and the difference between 30 day Eurodollar rate 
                                                 
5 Credit ratings range from 1-9 (S&P and Fitch: from B- to BBB+ and for Moody’s from B3 to Baa1). If 
more than one rating agency has rated the bond, the value of a given bond’s rating is the average of these ratings. 
If only one rating agency has rated the bond, then bond’s rating equals that value.   
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and treasury rate to control current short rate environment, steepness of the risk-free yield curve 
and potential liquidity effects on corporate bonds over Treasury bonds respectively. 
6.2 OLS regression model for credit rating analysis 
To test whether CoCo-specific variables affect ratings, I employ a regression models 
which incorporate them with the traditional credit metrics used by Moody’s. The models are as 
follows: 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
=  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽9𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    
 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
=  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     
 
As can be noted instantly, the only difference between the two models is the fact that first 
model has distance to trigger and equity volatility as separate variables whereas the second one 
couples these two together. As mentioned earlier, linking the value or credit spread of the CoCo 
solely to the distance to trigger is similar to valuing an option on the difference between the 
strike and the current value of the underlying security. Thus, I will follow the idea of De 
Spiegeleer et al. (2015) and create equity volatility adjusted distance to trigger variable for the 
second regression model. The variable equals bond’s distance to trigger divided by the issuer’s 
annual volatility measured by the price changes for the 180 most recent trading days prior issue 
date. Other CoCo-specific factors are unchanged from the earlier tests.  
Furthermore, other explanatory variables can be grouped on three categories: solvency 
related (capital and profitability), liquidity (asset liquidity) and qualitative adjustments 
25 
  
(Bloomberg ESG score). Here, the control variables are adapted from Moody’s (2015) updated 
credit rating methodology for banks which centers on core characteristics of solvency and 
liquidity. Regarding solvency, capital is measured by dividing tangible common equity by risk-
weighted assets (RWA) whereas profitability equals issuer’s net income divided by tangible 
assets. Liquidity is defined as liquid assets per total assets. The values of the aforementioned 
ratios are based on issuers’ latest financial statements before issue date. The data is collected 
from the Bloomberg. 
Additionally, Moody’s has identified three additional factors beyond traditional financial 
ratios that are important qualitative contributors to the soundness of a financial institution but 
which are either: (1) nonfinancial in nature; or (2) financial, but which we cannot readily assess 
via a common standard ratio. From these three qualitative factors corporate behavior is included 
in my model and it’s measured by Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure score which is based on the 
extent of a company's Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure. The score 
ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount of ESG data to 100 for those 
that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms of 
importance, with data such as Greenhouse Gas Emissions carrying greater weight than other 
disclosures. The score is also tailored to different industry sectors. In this way, each company 
is only evaluated in terms of the data that is relevant to its industry sector. 
7. Results  
In this section I will present the empirical findings of empirical study which is conducted 
with cross-sectional data consisting of 112 contingent convertible primary market transactions. 
First, I present and comment results of the OLS regression which includes all the 
aforementioned explanatory variables. Second, I go through separate regressions with, bond-
specific, firm-specific and interest rate-specific control variables. My results don’t create 
statistically significant and consistent evidence for H2, H3, and H4 - thus for each of them, H0 
can’t be rejected. However, my findings show that new issue credit spreads for CoCos’ are 
inversely related to the distance between bonds’ current CET1 capital ratio and the level of 
trigger capital ratio, thus creating support for H1. This is especially true when bond rating is 
excluded from the regression model since the “CET1 buffer” and bond’s credit rating 
experience notable multicollinearity. Additionally, the second main finding of my study is that 
credit ratings are the single most significant driver both economically and statistically for credit 
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spreads of contingent convertible securities when they are issued. By analyzing determinants 
of credit ratings, I find that credit rating agencies incorporate CoCo-specific factors into them. 
This explains the multicollinearity between these variables. To elaborate, volatility adjusted 
distance to trigger and permanent write-down dummy seem to be the biggest drivers of credit 
ratings. 
7.1 Full sample analysis 
   Table 3 illustrates the determinants of new issue credit spreads, respective regression 
coefficients, and related t-statistics. First column of the table presents regression results for the 
whole sample of 112 observations. Here, “rating” and “volatility” variables are excluded from 
the regression since some bonds are either unrated, issued by private company, or both. 
Moreover, the regression includes three qualitative variables which are all linked to CoCos’ 
loss absorption mechanism: equity conversion, temporary write-down, and permanent write- 
down. From the aforementioned variables equity conversion is selected as a reference category 
whereas write-down mechanisms are depicted as dummy variables.  
The most interesting finding from the first column is the value of distance to trigger 
variable. The interpretation of the coefficient is as follows: on average, one basis points increase 
in the distance between the issuer’s CET1 ratio and the level of trigger capital ratio decreases 
the new issue credit spread demanded by investors by 0.21 basis points. In other words, 100 
basis point increase in CET1 buffer (ceteris paribus) should lower the credit spread by 21 basis 
point at the issue date. Thus, H1 is accepted on 1 % confidence level and I can interpret that 
new issue credit spreads are inversely related to distance between issuer’s CET1 ratio at the 
issuance and the level of trigger capital ratio. Among other recent empirical studies, De 
Spiegeleer et al. (2015) report similar relationship. However, they note that equity volatility 
adjusted distance to trigger yields substantially higher R-squared figure and conclude that 
distance to trigger is a static picture which doesn’t reflect information about the business risk 
of a particular financial institution. De Spiegeleer et al. (2015) also remark that linking the value 
of the CoCo bond solely to the distance to trigger is similar to valuing an option on the 
difference between the strike and the value of the underlying security. Thus, future empirical 
studies should control volatility by taking equity volatility adjusted distance to trigger into 
consideration. Here, equity volatility is taken into account as a separate explanatory variable. 
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Based on the above, my results about distance to trigger reflect the “intrinsic value” of CoCo 
bond and simultaneously establish ground for forthcoming research.          
In addition, it should be noted that new issue credit spreads are higher for bonds that are 
written down permanently compared to those that have temporary write down as a loss 
absorption mechanism. Put differently, CoCos with temporary write-down feature seem have 
Variable Whole Sample (n=112) Public (n=86) Rated (n=88) Public and Rated (n=75)
Intercept 938.92*** 755.02*** 1016.39*** 764.09***
(8.32) (7.44) (10.21) (7.30)
CoCo-specific
Distance to Trigger -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.10* -0.02
(-3.72) (-3.07) (-1.95) (-0.35)
Trigger Capital Ratio -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 0.02
(-1.39) (-0.66) (-0.60) (0.19)
Permanent Writedown -57.74 -49.84 16.71 0.92
(-1.27) (-1.25) (0.45) (0.02)
Temporary Writedown -67.92 -52.25 -32.36 -41.15
(-1.54) (-1.36) (-0.93) (-1.17)
Bond-specific
Liquidity -0.07*** -0.03 -0.02 0.00
(-3.22) (-1.45) (-1.12) -0.2
Maturity -21.64*** -14.25** -17.42*** -12.32**
(-2.61) (-2.16) (-2.94) (-2.35)
Rating - - -49.22*** -44.56***
(-5.29) (-4.74)
Firm-specific
Volatility - 0.05*** - 0.08***
(3.82) (3.44)
Market-specific
1y Risk Free Rate -0.31 -0.58* -0.59 -0.68
(-0.79) (-1.88) (-1.10) (-1.41)
10y-2y Risk Free Rate 0.43 -0.05 -0.09 -0.15
(1.39) (-0.17) (-0.36) (-0.66)
3mo Euribor - 3mo Bubill 2.21** 1.63* 3.14*** 2.32***
(2.24) (1.78) (3.55) (2.92)
0.28 0.41 0.47 0.51
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Adjusted 𝑅2
Table 3 Credit spread determinants: linear variables 
This table presents the new issue credit spread determinants for different samples. All determinants presented in this 
table are linear. Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific effects (distance to trigger, trigger capital ratio, permanent write 
down dummy, and temporary write down dummy), bond-specific effects (liquidity, maturity, and rating), firm-specific effects 
(volatility), and market-specific effects (1 year risk-free rate, difference between 10 year risk-free rate and 2 year risk-free rate, 
and the difference between 3 month Euribor rate and Germany 3 month government bill yield). All values are reported on basis 
points. Unit of liquidity is one million US dollar, maturity is reported in years whereas values for the rating-variable ranges 
between 1 and 9 (numeric values are converted from the actual credit ratings, from B- to BBB+, namely). 
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higher credit spread discount than CoCos with permanent write-down feature. However, this 
finding is not statistically significant. Consequently, H3 and H4 can’t be accepted.  
Both liquidity and maturity are statistically significant on 1 percentage level. Moreover, 
the latter has also notable impact on credit spread: one year extension of bond’s maturity 
decreases the demanded credit spread by 21.64 basis points. The inverse relationship between 
credit spread and bond’s maturity is not a completely surprising result. For example, results of 
Pennacchi’s (2010) structural model show that when capital is low and the likelihood of 
conversion losses are high, contingent capital bonds’ spreads over their respective default-free 
Treasury yields are a decreasing function of maturity. Earlier theoretical studies such as Jarrow 
et al. (1997) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) have also found the similar downward sloping 
or hump-shaped credit spread curves for speculative-grade issuers. Furthermore, Helwege and 
Turner (1999) have showed that inverse relationship between maturity and credit spreads results 
from the fact that the safer high-yield issuers in a given rating category tend to have longer term 
bonds, leading to a sample selection bias in regression estimates. 
Second column includes regression results for the 86 contingent convertible bonds which 
are issued by publicly traded companies (i.e. companies that have equity volatility data on 
Bloomberg. These CoCos are referred as “public”). First, including equity volatility to 
regression model raises the adjusted R-squared almost by 13 percentage points compared to 
first column’s regression. Second interesting finding is the dramatic decline of the intercept 
variable. Compared to whole sample, publicly traded CoCo issuers pay on average 183 basis 
points less for their contingent convertible capital than their non-publicly traded peers.  Another 
interesting finding is that the inclusion of equity volatility variable reduces the effect of CoCo-
specific factors on new issue credit spreads. However, distance to trigger factor remains 
statistically significant on 1 percent confidence level. Thirdly, the volatility factor itself is 
positively correlated with new issue credit spreads. The interpretation of the coefficient is that 
one basis point increase in annual volatility of issuer’s stock price increases credit spread by 
0.05 basis points on average. Thus, increase of 1 percentage point in stock’s excess volatility 
predicts 5 basis point increase of the credit spread. These findings are in line with Campbell 
and Taksler (2003) and Chen et al. (2007) who document both statistically and economically 
significant effect of equity volatility on bond credit spreads. 
Third column presents regression results for the rated sample of 88 CoCos. First, 
including rating variable to regression model raises the adjusted R-squared more than 18 
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percentage points compared to first column’s regression and 5 percentage points second 
column’s regression.  As in earlier regressions, the intercept variable is statistically different 
from zero on the 1 percent level and amounts to 1016.39 basis points. Furthermore, rating is 
clearly correlated with CoCo-specific factors since their magnitude and significance decrease 
notably compared to the whole sample. Same effect can be observed with maturity factor. 
Multicollinearity between these factors gives evidence that rating agencies incorporate these 
CoCo- and bond-specific factors, among other variables, in their analyses of new contingent 
convertible issues. This finding is in line with Campbell and Taksler (2003) who note that credit 
ratings are designed to contain information outside the basic accounting data. The rating itself 
is predominantly negatively correlated with new issue credit spread: on average, one notch 
upgrade on credit rating6 results in 49 basis points decrease in demanded credit spread. The 
coefficient is statistically significant on 1 percent level. The effects of CoCo- and bond-specific 
factors to credit rating are explored later on this study.  
Fourth column from Table 3 presents regression results for the public and rated CoCos. 
First, including both volatility and rating variable to the regression model raise the adjusted R-
squared to 0.5117 which equals almost 5 percentage point increase compared to regression on 
the third column. However, the most notable finding from this regression is the fact that 
inclusion of both rating and volatility factor decrease the impact and statistical significance of 
CoCo-specific factors substantially. The effect of maturity remains more or less invariable and 
statistically significant.  
Finally, regarding market specific variables only the “TED spread” (3mo Euribor – 3mo 
Bubill) has statistically significant correlation with new issue credit spreads on 1 % level. 
Irrespective of the sample, the coefficient for this variable is positive, as a wider spread 
indicates a flight to quality or liquidity, which will increase the required compensation for 
holding risky bonds. Longstaff (2004) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) have documented 
similar results. 
Furthermore, Table 4 presents results of OLS regressions with modified variables. Here, 
new issue credit spread (dependent variable), distance to trigger, liquidity and excess volatility 
are converted to natural logarithms of their original values. Additionally, maturity is squared. 
As can be seen from the Table 3, the non-linear variables don’t change regression outputs 
                                                 
6 Credit ratings range from 1-9 (S&P and Fitch: from B- to BBB+ and for Moody’s from B3 to Baa1). If 
more than one rating agency has rated the bond, the value of a given bond’s rating is the average of these ratings. 
If only one rating agency has rated the bond, then bond’s rating equals that value.   
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notably. Variables that were significant on with linear regressions remain significant with non-
linear values. The values of adjusted R-squared decrease to some extent when non-linear 
variables are used.  
7.2 Subsample analysis: public and rated contingent convertibles 
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions which are based on the data of public and 
rated CoCos. Here I’m analyzing the effect of including different variables sequentially (i.e. 
Table 4 Credit spread determinants: linear and non-linear variables 
This table presents the new issue credit spread determinants for different samples. Table contains both linear and non-
linear variables. Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific effects (natural logarithm of distance to trigger, trigger capital 
ratio, permanent write down dummy, and temporary write down dummy), bond-specific effects (natural logarithm of liquidity, 
maturity raised to second order, and rating), firm-specific effects (natural logarithm of volatility), and market-specific effects 
(1 year risk-free rate, difference between 10 year risk-free rate and 2 year risk-free rate, and the difference between 3 month 
Euribor rate and Germany 3 month government bill yield). All linear values are reported on basis points. Unit of liquidity is 
natural logarithm of amount issued in USD millions , maturity is reported in years raised to second order whereas values for 
the rating-variable range between 1 and 9 (numeric values are converted from the actual credit ratings, from B- to BBB+, 
namely). 
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CoCo-, bond-, firm- and market-specific variables) to the regression model. Thus, I am breaking 
down the incremental effects of different variables from the fourth column of Table 2. The 
results of this sequential analysis are more or less in line with those presented above. That is to 
say, the magnitude and sign of different variables don’t change dramatically. 
Again, distance to trigger is negatively correlated with the new issue credit spreads. 
Correlation is statistically significant to the point when rating variable is included into 
regression model as an explanatory variable. Consequently, subsample analysis creates more 
Table 5 Credit spread determinants: public and rated CoCos 
This table presents the new issue credit spread determinants for public and rated CoCos. All determinants presented in 
this table are linear. Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific effects (distance to trigger, trigger capital ratio, permanent 
write down dummy, and temporary write down dummy), bond-specific effects (liquidity and maturity), market-specific effects 
(1 year risk-free rate, difference between 10 year risk-free rate and 2 year risk-free rate, and the difference between 3 month 
Euribor rate and Germany 3 month government bill yield) and rating and volatility. All values are reported on basis points. 
Unit of liquidity is one million US dollar, maturity is reported in years whereas values for the rating-variable range between 1 
and 9 (numeric values are converted from the actual credit ratings, from B- to BBB+, namely). 
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evidence for H1. Moreover, the significance of the variable ranges from -0.22 basis points to -
0.02 basis points depending on the number of explanatory variables included.  
Like with the broader sample, the level of trigger capital ratio seems to be irrelevant for 
credit spread demanded by investors. This is somewhat intuitive since linking the spread of the 
CoCo bond solely to the level of trigger capital ratio is similar to valuing an option based on 
the level of strike price. Like with options, one needs naturally take the distance to trigger and 
the volatility of the capital ratio into account when estimating appropriate credit spread for a 
given CoCo. In this framework, it is not surprising that also subsample analysis fails to create 
evidence for H2.     
Furthermore, the coefficient for permanent write-down dummy is positive when only 
public and rated CoCos are analyzed. Even though coefficients are not statistically significant 
they show that new issue credit spreads are higher for CoCos that are written down permanently 
compared to those that have temporary write-down or equity conversion as a loss absorption 
mechanism. Aforementioned builds support for H3 in this subsample.  
The fourth column clearly implies multicollinearity between CoCos’ distance to trigger 
and credit rating variable: the statistical and economical significance of the former declines 
notably when latter is added to the regression model. The significance of the distance to trigger 
variable declines even more when volatility variable is included (fifth column). In addition, 
rating variable increases improves model’s fit notably. The value of adjusted R-square jumps 
from 0.26 to 0.43. Model’s adjusted R-square increases to 0.58 when volatility variable is also 
included.  
Finally, the economical and statistical significance of bond- and market-specific variables 
stays somewhat unchanged with the subsample of public and rated CoCos. Bonds’ maturity is 
still has statistically significant negative correlation with new issue credit spread whereas the 
“TED spread” (3mo Euribor – 3mo Bubill) has the opposite effect on spreads. As mentioned 
above, both of these findings are in line with the earlier literature.  
The coefficients of non-linear variables for public and rated CoCos are presented in Table 
6. Again, dependent variable and distance to trigger, liquidity and volatility are converted to 
natural logarithms. Additionally, rating variable is squared. As with the whole sample, non-
linear variables don’t change the relative significance of coefficients notably. The effects on 
adjusted R-squared are mixed. However, linear variables result to better fit when volatility and 
rating are included as an explanatory variables.    
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7.3 Credit rating analysis 
My results have so far presented consistent evidence mainly for the hypothesis that credit 
spreads for CoCos’ are inversely related to the distance between issuers current CET1 capital 
Table 6 Credit spread determinants: public and rated CoCos, non-linear variables 
This table presents the new issue credit spread determinants. Table contains both linear and non-linear variables. 
Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific effects (natural logarithm of distance to trigger, trigger capital ratio, permanent 
write down dummy, and temporary write down dummy), bond-specific effects (natural logarithm of liquidity, maturity raised 
to second order, and rating), market-specific effects (1 year risk-free rate, difference between 10 year risk-free rate and 2 year 
risk-free rate, and the difference between 3 month Euribor rate and Germany 3 month government bill yield), rating and 
volatility (natural logarithm). All linear values are reported on basis points. Unit of liquidity is natural logarithm of amount 
issued in USD millions , maturity is reported in years raised to second order whereas values for the rating-variable range 
between 1 and 9 (numeric values are converted from the actual credit ratings, from B- to BBB+, namely). 
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ratio and the level of trigger capital ratio (H1). For other three hypotheses, regression results 
generate mixed evidence. However, besides hypotheses validity, both full and subsample 
analysis revealed economically and statistically negative correlation between credit spreads and 
credit rating. This is not surprising since, as found in the literature and supported in this article, 
credit ratings are the most important single source of information on credit risk overall (see, 
e.g., Hand et al. (1992), Hite and Warga (1997), Daniel and Jensen (2005)). 
Moreover, especially the subsample analysis showed multicollinearity between CoCo-
specific variables and credit rating. Thus, based on the above, one could hypothesize that credit 
rating agencies include distinct features of contingent convertible bonds, among other 
traditional credit metrics, into ratings for these hybrid securities. If so, one could argue further 
that these features play role in primary market pricing of CoCos since credit rating itself has 
significant impact on credit spreads, as depicted above. 
Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates for the first OLS regression model introduced 
earlier. Again, I include different control variables sequentially to the regression model. Starting 
from the first column, one can see that every variable except temporary write-down has 
statistically significant effect on credit rating. Like earlier, distance to trigger and trigger capital 
ratio are presented in basis points. Thus, for example, 100 basis point improvement to distance 
to trigger should increase the credit rating by 0.01 notches7. Contrary to earlier results, in 
addition to intercept and distance to trigger variables, both trigger capital ratio and permanent 
write-down variables are both economically and statistically significant.  
Second, quite surprisingly, equity volatility solely doesn’t seem to have significant effect 
on credit rating (second column). Result might be indication that volatility, as mentioned before, 
should be coupled with distance to trigger variable. This argument is investigated with the 
second regression model later on.  
Third, similar to volatility variable, neither capital nor profitability seem to have 
economically or statistically significant effect on a given CoCo’s credit rating. Introduction of 
the solvency variables has most notable effect on intercept variable which jumps from 2.79 to 
4.21. One possible reason behind the jump is the data sampling issue since eight issuers lack 
the relevant solvency data on Bloomberg.  
                                                 
7Like earlier, values for the rating-variable range between 1 and 9 (numeric values are converted from the 
actual credit ratings, from B- to BBB+, namely) based on the average of credit rating given by S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch.  
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Finally, fourth and fifth column on Table 7 show that asset liquidity and company's 
corporate behavior measured by Bloomberg’s ESG score don’t seem to be related on CoCos’ 
credit rating in this sample. The most notable finding from the credit rating analysis is the 
significance of permanent write-down dummy which seems to increase the credit rating more 
than one notch. The reason behind this might be the fact that all three credit rating agencies 
have been rating CoCos only since 2013. Among other uncertainties, the existence of 
discretionary triggers and equity conversion created valuation uncertainties, which have further 
Table 7 Credit rating determinants for CoCos 
This table presents credit rating determinants for rated CoCos. All determinants presented in this table are linear. 
Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific effects (distance to trigger, trigger capital ratio, permanent write down dummy, 
and temporary write down dummy), volatility (annualized volatility of issuer's equity is computed from the last 180 trading 
days), solvency-specific effects ( capital which is total common equity divided by risk weighted assets and profitability which 
is annual return divided by total assets), liquidity-specific effects (asset liquidity which is liquid assets divided by total assets) 
and qualitative adjustments (Bloomberg's ESG score which ranges from 0.1 to 100) . All the loading factors for independent 
variables, except dummies and Bloomberg's ESG Score, are sensitivities per one basis point change in the variable. The 
dependent variable, namely the aggregated credit rating score, can have values from 1 to 9. 
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complicated the ratings process (BIS Quarterly Review, 2013). At least partly based on this, 
permanent write-down as a loss-absorption mechanism has become more common in CoCos 
that have been issued during or after 2013 since it reduces valuation uncertainty. This might be 
one possible explanation why permanent write-down feature seems to improve bond’s rating 
compared to one that has equity conversion as a loss absorption mechanism. However, this 
argument is definitely proper subject for future research as amount of data expands. 
Table 8 presents reports the coefficient estimates for the second OLS regression model 
which incorporates equity volatility adjusted distance to trigger variable. Otherwise results on 
Tables 7 and 8 are fully comparable. 
 First, the factor loadings for the CoCo-specific factors (column 1) are in line with the 
earlier regression which included distance to trigger and equity volatility as separate 
independent variables. However, the most notable finding from Table 7 is the factor loading of 
volatility adjusted distance trigger which amounts to 4.34 on 1 % percent confidence level.  The 
interpretation of the aforementioned variable is as follows: if annual volatility of issuer’s equity 
equals distance to trigger, the variable gets value of 1 and credit rating should increase 4.34 
notches on average. As described earlier, volatility adjusted distance to trigger is received by 
dividing distance to trigger by annual volatility of issuer’s equity. The factor loading remains 
both economically and statistically significant even when traditional credit metric variables are 
included into the regression model (columns 2-4).   
Second, the addition of solvency variables has similar effects as with first credit rating 
regression: intercept, volatility adjusted distance to trigger and permanent write-down dummy 
have the most prominent effect on the credit rating.  
Third, after adding liquidity and quality adjustment variables the significance of 
profitability increases notably. However, the effect of profitability to credit rating is somewhat 
constrained here since values of the variable range between -244 and 219 basis points where as 
the factor loading is only 0.01 per one basis point increase or decrease. Thus, intercept, volatility 
adjusted distance to trigger and both dummy variables remain the most significant explanatory 
variables for credit ratings. This finding holds for both above depicted regression models. 
Additionally, the economical and statistical significance of volatility adjusted distance to trigger 
variable induces interesting questions for the future research of contingent convertibles 
securities.  
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7.4 Robustness check 
To test robustness of my results, I will run similar regression as presented in Table 3 with 
another dataset which consists of bonds issued in Asia-Pacific and Latin-America regions (i.e. 
non-European issuers). Though the dataset consists of only 30 CoCos, the results are in line 
with the earlier presented findings and thus corroborate them.   
Table 8 Credit rating determinants for CoCos 
This table presents credit rating determinants for rated CoCos. All determinants presented in this table are linear. 
Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific effects (volatility adjusted distance to trigger which is distance to trigger divided 
by annual volatility of issuers equity computed from the last 180 trading days, trigger capital ratio, permanent write down 
dummy, and temporary write down dummy), solvency-specific effects ( capital which is total common equity divided by risk 
weighted assets and profitability which is annual return divided by total assets), liquidity-specific effects (asset liquidity which 
is liquid assets divided by total assets) and qualitative adjustments (Bloomberg's ESG score which ranges from 0.1 to 100) . 
The loading factors for the following independent variables are sensitivities per one basis point change in the variable: trigger 
capital ratio, capital, profitability and asset liquidity. Volatility adjusted distance to trigger is ratio which is calculated by 
dividing distance to trigger by annual volatility of issuer's equity. Bloomberg ESG score ranges from 0.1 to 100. The dependent 
variable, namely the aggregated credit rating score, can have values from 1 to 9. 
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The reason why this small set of data is excluded from the main dataset is that these bonds 
have considerably more idiosyncratic features which deviate from their European counterparts. 
First of all, Asia-Pacific and Latin-America CoCos have various discretionary triggers, or point 
of non-viability (PONV) triggers, which are activated based on local supervisors’ judgment 
about the issuing bank’s solvency prospects. Second, basically all AT1 CoCos issued by 
Australian banks have scheduled mandatory conversion on predetermined date under certain 
market conditions. This feature is stark contrast to European AT1s which, by the definition, 
don’t have any predetermined mandatory conversion or redemption date. Third, Moody’s 
defines these instruments either as non-cumulative preferred shares or subordinated debt even 
though they have distinct CoCo-features (predefined trigger level and loss-absorption 
mechanisms, namely). Based on the above mentioned differences I will examine this dataset 
separately. 
Table 9 reports the new issue credit spreads factors, respective factor loadings, and related 
t-statistics. Several interesting results stand out from the table. First, excluding the public 
sample (second column), sign and significance of distance to trigger variable is in line with the 
results presented earlier. That is to say, my first hypothesis that new issue credit spreads for 
CoCos’ are inversely related to the distance between bonds’ current CET1 capital ratio and the 
level of trigger capital ratio receives more backing.  
Second, regarding to bond specific factors, same factors stand out as with the European 
data. The effect of maturity is again significant both economically and statistically. This finding 
is in line with results of Helwege and Turner (1999) which show, that for speculative grade 
bonds, better quality firms are able to issue bonds with longer maturity. This causes a negative 
relation between the yield spread and maturity for these bonds. In addition to maturity, also 
rating has significantly negative effect on new issue credit spreads. Again, the sign and loading 
of this factor are in line results derived from the European data.  
Third, the signs and loadings of all the market specific factors are also consistent with my 
main results and earlier literature. First of all, as pointed out by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
higher spot rate increases risk-neutral drift of the firm value process. A higher drift reduces the 
probability of default, and in turn, reduces the credit spread. Duffee (1998) has also provided 
similar evidence of negative relation between changes in credit spreads and interest rates. 
Additionally, the sign for flight to quality factor (3m Euribor -3m Bubill) is as expected. The 
expected coefficient of this variable is positive, as wider spread indicates a flight to quality or 
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liquidity, which will increase the required compensation for holding corporate bonds (Longstaff 
F. A., 2004). Furthermore, it’s somewhat surprising to see that European flight to quality factor 
works has significant effect also on Asia-Pacific and Latin-America data.  
To conclude, even though the dataset utilized for robustness check is limited, the results 
are in line with the main results throughout the different factors. As earlier, the coefficient of 
distance to trigger factor strengthens the main results of this study and thus creates more 
evidence for my H1. Both write-down dummies have expected signs, though coefficients are 
not statistically significant throughout different regression models. Consequently, the data fails 
to create solid evidence for H3 and H4. Trigger capital ratio factor is omitted here because all 
Table 9 Credit spread determinants for Asian-Pacific and Latin-American CoCos 
This table presents the new issue credit spread determinants for CoCos issued by Asia-Pacific and Latin-American 
banks and financial institutions. All determinants presented in this table are linear. Determinants are grouped into CoCo-specific 
effects (distance to trigger, permanent write down dummy, and temporary write down dummy), bond-specific effects (liquidity, 
maturity, and rating), firm-specific effects (volatility), and market-specific effects (1 year risk-free rate, difference between 10 
year risk-free rate and 2 year risk-free rate, and the difference between 3 month Euribor rate and Germany 3 month government 
bill yield). All values are reported on basis points. Unit of liquidity is one million US dollar, maturity is reported in years 
whereas values for the rating-variable ranges between 1 and 9 (numeric values are converted from the actual credit ratings, 
from B- to BBB+, namely). 
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except two bonds have the same trigger capital ratio (5.125%). Thus, H2 can’t be tested here.   
Finally, as mentioned above, results are consistent with earlier credit spread literature. 
8. Conclusions 
This study examines the determinants of new issue credit spreads of novel hybrid bank 
capital called contingent convertibles, or CoCos. The key contribution of the current paper is 
to find out whether credit spread determinants introduced by Pennacchi (2010) can explain the 
primary market pricing of banks’ CoCo bonds. Utilizing CoCo issuance data from 2009 to 
March 2015 and controlling all the relevant credit spread determinants my results bring partial 
evidence for Pennacchi’s (2010) predictions. Main analyses are conducted with European data 
whereas Asian-Pacific and Latin-America data is used to tests robustness of the European 
results. In addition to credit spread determinants, I’m also studying whether rating agencies 
incorporate different CoCo-specific factors into their ratings. 
Results of my study generate consistent evidence for H1 which proposes that credit 
spreads at the issuance for both fixed and floating rate CoCos’ are inversely related to the 
distance between bonds’ current CET1 capital ratio and the level of trigger capital ratio. This 
finding is both economically and statistically significant both Europe and Asia-Pacific & Latin-
America regions. Moreover, analysis of public and rated CoCos creates evidence for my third 
hypothesis, which was meant to test whether investors demand higher credit spread for CoCos 
which are written down permanently rather than converted into equity. Similar results arise 
from Asian-Pacific and Latin-America data which is used for robustness check. However, the 
factor coefficients for permanent write down dummies are not consistently statistically 
significant so H3 can’t be accepted.  
Concerning H2 and H4, my analysis fails to create consistent evidence to them. That is 
to say, trigger capital ratio itself doesn’t have meaningful effect on new issue credit spreads of 
contingent convertible bonds. Furthermore, temporary write down feature seems to have 
opposite effect to credit spreads as expected as it generally decreases the demanded credit 
spread compared to CoCos with equity conversion as loss absorption mechanism. However, 
given that issuers are increasingly adopting write down features to CoCos, the comparison 
between equity conversion vs. nominal write down features might become redundant in the 
future. 
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The by-product and other main finding of my study is that credit ratings are the single 
most significant driver both economically and statistically for credit spreads of contingent 
convertible securities when they are issued. By analyzing determinants of credit ratings, I find 
that credit rating agencies incorporate CoCo-specific factors into them. This explains the 
multicollinearity between these variables. To elaborate, volatility adjusted distance to trigger 
and permanent write-down dummy seem to be the biggest drivers of credit ratings. The positive 
and significant effect of permanent write down feature might reflect rating agencies’ inclination 
towards transparent and calculable loss-absorption features. Either way, both offer interesting 
topics for further research. 
Finally, although this study is motivated by testing the predictions of structural model of 
contingent capital, there is clear demand for research which takes idiosyncrasies of CoCos more 
broadly into consideration and tries to explain the observed credit spreads and credit ratings 
with expanded list of CoCo-specific features. For example, typically coupons of CoCos are to 
be cancelled if issuer’s capital slides below Combined Buffer which consists of minimum CET1 
capital, capital conservation buffer, GSIB buffer and countercyclical buffer. Thus, distance to 
Combined Buffer could be relevant factor behind credit spreads of CoCos and thereby 
interesting object for future exploration alongside volatility adjusted distance to trigger and 
different write-down dummies.  
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